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This paper investigates the extent to which euro area monetary policy has 
responded to evolving economic conditions in individual member states as 
opposed to the euro area as a whole. Based on a forward-looking Taylor rule-type 
policy reaction function, we conduct counterfactual exercises that compare the 
monetary policy behaviour of the ECB under alternative hypothetical scenarios: 
(1) the euro member states make individual policy decisions, and (2) the ECB 
responds to the economic conditions of individual members. Stress measures are 
then constructed to evaluate the degree of divergence of member state economies 
under these two hypothetical scenarios. The results we obtain reflect the extent of 
heterogeneity among the national economies in the monetary union, indicating 
that euro area policy rates have been particularly close to the ‘counterfactual’ 
interest rates of the largest euro members and countries with similar economic 
conditions, namely Germany, Austria, Belgium and France. 
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Maakohtaiset paineet euroalueen yhteiseen 
rahapolitiikkaan sopeutumisessa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 11/2009 
Jim Lee – Patrick M. Crowley 
 




Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, missä määrin euroalueen yhteinen raha-
politiikka on reagoinut koko euroalueen sijasta yksittäisten jäsenmaiden taloudel-
lisiin olosuhteisiin. Keskuspankki käyttää korkoa rahapolitiikan välineenä. Kes-
kuspankin ohjauskoron muutokset määräytyvät vallitsevien talouden liikakysyntä-
paineiden sekä ennakoitujen tulevien inflaatiopaineiden perusteella. Tutkimukses-
sa verrataan kahta tosiasiallisten tapahtumien simuloitua vaihtoehtoa. Näistä en-
simmäisessä rahapolitiikan päätöksenteko on delegoitu kunkin jäsenmaan keskus-
pankille, kun taas toisessa EKP:n toteuttama rahapolitiikka perustuu koko euro-
alueen sijasta yksittäisten jäsenmaiden talousnäkymiin. Työssä kehitetään paine-
mittareita, joiden avulla voidaan verrata jäsenmaiden talouksien erkaantumista 
toisistaan näissä kahdessa vaihtoehtoisessa skenaariossa. Tutkimustulokset kuvas-
tavat rahaliiton jäsenmaiden välisiä erilaisuuksia ja viittaavat siihen, että toteu-
tuneet euroalueen ohjauskorot ovat olleet lähellä simuloituja korkoja sekä suurissa 
että taloudellisilta ominaisuuksiltaan samankaltaisissa jäsenmaissa, joihin tulosten 
mukaan kuuluvat Belgia, Itävalta, Saksa ja Ranska. 
 
Avainsanat: Euroopan keskuspankki, rahapoliittinen toimenpide, Taylorin sääntö, 
kontrafaktuaali analyysi 
 
JEL-luokittelu: E52, C53  
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In 1999, all but four members of the then European Union participated in
the ﬁnal stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) process by
adopting the euro as their national currency and transferring responsibility for
monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB) — the hub institution
of the Eurosystem. The oﬃcial policy stance of the ECB is that monetary
policy decisions are reﬂective of changing economic conditions of the euro area
as a whole, and do not reﬂect the diversity among the national economies
(Duisenberg, 2001). While the establishment of the ECB is necessary for
a monetary union between EU member states, its ‘one size ﬁts all’ monetary
policy has faced criticisms on many fronts, and indeed it is now largely accepted
that ‘all will not ﬁt one size’ in most circumstances. The question is whether
the strains are tolerable within the euro area this clearly requires empirical
evaluation so as to judge which member states might encounter severe tensions
by remaining in the monetary union. To begin to answer this question clearly
requires empirical evaluation, so the research in this paper represents a ﬁrst
attempt at analysing the evolving situation in the euro area by member state.
The eﬃcacy of a single monetary policy for all euro area members is similar
to the issue of whether the member states participating in the euro area
constitute an optimum currency area. Above all, the signiﬁcant amount of
diversity that remains among euro area members today constitutes a challenge
to the implementation of a single currency or monetary policy which may or
may not increase over time. A growing volume of literature (eg, Faust, Robers,
and Wright, 2001; Carstensen, 2006; Arestis and Chortareas, 2006; Fendel
and Frenkel, 2006, and Sturm and Wollmershäuser, 20081) has attempted to
evaluate the performance of the ECB in managing the aggregate economy of
the euro area. For instance, Faust, Rogers, and Wright (2001) rely on the
behavior of Germany’s Bundesbank in the pre-euro period as a benchmark to
evaluate the ECB policy. Many of these studies are, however, hampered by
the short history of the euro area, so the results of these earlier studies appear
to be rather fragile and/or anecdotal.
The objective of the present paper is to evaluate the performance of euro
area monetary policy by comparing the historical policy behavior against the
hypothetical monetary policies of its members. More speciﬁcally, we ask
two related questions: (1) What would the policy interest rates have been
if the ECB were to make policy decisions based on the economic conditions
of individual euro area member states instead of the euro area as a whole?;
and (2) What would the interest rates of euro area member states have been if
their central banks were given the power to make individual policy decisions?
The two questions are addressed using counterfactual exercises with a popular
1The research in this paper was conducted separately from but almost concurrently with
Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008), who also construct policy stress measures using a Taylor
rule. Despite the similar goals and theoretical frameworks between the two papers, the
data and estimation methods diﬀer. More speciﬁcally, Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008)
apply OLS estimation with survey data as a proxy for inﬂation expectations. We instead
apply recursive estimation to account to structural change and a GMM estimator to capture
inﬂation expectations. The key results of both papers are, nevertheless, comparable.
7Taylor rule-type policy reaction function. Based on these exercises we can
construct aggregate ‘stress’ measures which indicate how divergent economic
conditions are within the euro area. Following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1998), policy ‘stress’ refers to the extent to which actual policy deviates from
optimal policy. In the case of the ECB, its policy at a given period may not
necessarily be appropriate for each of the euro area member states or what
they individually would prefer. The more heterogeneity among the economic
conditions of individual countries, the greater is the extent of policy stress for
the ECB’s single monetary policy for the whole euro area.
In addition to the counterfactual analysis — an approach diﬀerent from the
traditional regression-based methods in earlier studies — our work contributes
to the existing monetary policy literature in three directions. First, our results
beneﬁt from nearly a decade of ECB history as opposed to earlier studies
with limited data observations. Second, we implement recursive estimation
to accommodate observed instability in feedback coeﬃcients of the reaction
functions. This method allows us to model evolving monetary policy conduct,
particularly in terms of central banks’ changing weights on individual economic
variables. Third, we include monetary aggregates in the Taylor rule as a
representation of the ECB’s ‘second pillar’ of the oﬃcial ECB monetary policy
strategy, and also include inﬂation targets which represent the Maastricht
criteria for inﬂation for the pre-1999 period.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses
the methodology and data. The third section presents the estimation results
based on a Taylor rule-type reaction function. The fourth section discusses
the results of some counterfactual exercises in order to evaluate the monetary
policy implications of disparate economic experiences among euro area member
states. The ﬁfth section concludes the paper.
2 Empirical methodology
2.1 The Taylor rule
We explore central bank behavior using the Taylor rule, which has become the
most popular formulation of a monetary policy reaction function.2 As interest
rates are not expected to instantaneously adjust to changes in interest rates
and the output gap, a dynamic version of the Taylor rule can be used thereby
incorporating ‘interest rate smoothing’ so that interest rates are adjusted
through time to any new developments in inﬂation and output.
Following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) and Faust, Robers, and Wright
( 2 0 0 1 ) ,a m o n go t h e r s ,t h eb a s e l i n es p e c i ﬁcation of a dynamic version of the
Taylor rule for a central bank’s policy instrument is expressed as
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)i
∗
t + εt (2.1)
2See Fernandez and Nikolsko-Rzbevskyy (2007) for a recent comparison of diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of the Taylor rule.
8where ε is an i.i.d. error term with a zero mean. The term i∗ denotes the central
bank’s ‘target’ interest rate, and the parameter ρ captures the interest-rate
smoothing behavior in monetary policy conduct, or policy inertia.
According to this forward-looking version of the policy reaction function,
the central bank responds to (i) the expected rate of inﬂation (πt)b e t w e e n
periods t and t+n that is above its targeted rate π∗
t and (ii) the current
expected value of the output gap, which is the diﬀerence between expected
output level (yt) and the potential output level y∗
t. Price stability and output
stabilization are widely considered as the dual objectives of many central
banks. From 1999 to 2003 the ECB oﬃcially followed a two-pillar strategy
(European Central Bank, 2003),3 putting equal emphasis on targeting both
inﬂation and the money supply, but in recent years the emphasis on the
money supply (the ‘second pillar’) has waned, leading to pressure from various
quarters to reinstate money supply targeting as an important component of
monetary policy.4 The central objective of ECB monetary policy is price
stability, and that is supported by the ﬁrst pillar of economic analysis of
dynamics and shocks (what is traditionally incorporated into a typical Taylor
rule) and the ‘second pillar’ reﬂects monetary analysis, that is, developments in
monetary growth, particularly in the broad M3 monetary aggregate.5 Because
of this so-called ‘second pillar’ of monetary policy, we augment the conventional
Taylor rule with an additional variable, namely the growth rate of a monetary




t = β0 + β1(E [πt+n | Ωt] − π
∗
t)+β2(E [yt | Ωt] − y
∗
t) (2.2)
+β3(E [mt | Ωt] − m
∗
t)
where mt denotes money growth, m∗
t its targeted rate, and E is an expectation
operator given the information available to the central bank at time t, Ωt.
To facilitate cross-country comparisons, we do not follow recent studies
(eg, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1998) and instead calculate the inﬂation
rate that would satisfy EMU membership6 for the pre-1999 period and then
for the post-1999 period we use a 2% ﬁx e d‘ t a r g e t ’r a t ea sE C Bo ﬃcials
3In May 2003, the ECB announced its revised monetary policy strategy that no longer
explicitly assigned monetary growth a ‘prominent role’ in its policy conduct (Carstensen,
2006).
4‘The second perspective or pillar — the ‘monetary analysis’ — focuses on a longer-term
horizon, exploiting the long-run link between money and changes in the general price level.’
and ‘Our two-pillar approach is designed to ensure that no relevant information is lost in the
assessment of the risks to price stability and that appropriate attention is paid to diﬀerent
perspectives and the cross-checking of information in order to come to an overall judgement
of the risks to price stability’. Extracts from speech given by Axel Weber, President of the
Bundesbank in York, UK, 10th June, 2008.
5In 2003 the two pillars were reversed, with economic analysis gaining greater prominence,
and monetary analysis having a secondary role, but the ECB continues to defend a separate
monetary pillar (see speech by Member of the ECB’s Executive Board, Otmar Issing, at
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2005/html/sp050603.en.html).
6The Maastricht Treaty speciﬁes that the criteria for the inﬂation rate for member states
to qualify for membership of EMU is the lowest three inﬂation rates in the European Union
plus 1.5 per cent.
9(European Central Bank, 1998; and European Central Bank, 2003) have
explicitly deﬁned price stability as an inﬂation rate below 2% over the medium
term. Although the ECB has announced a reference value of 4.5% for
annual M3 growth (European Central Bank, 1998), Huchet (2000) asserts
that it has never attempted to keep monetary growth at that reference value
by changing interest rates. Moreover, various studies (eg, Favero, Freixas,
Persson, and Wyplosz, 2000; Svensson, 2000) have shown that monetary
growth has never played a leading role in the monetary policy practice of
the ECB, but various studies (associated with the ECB) have given credence
to the use of the second pillar as a long term indicator of inﬂationary pressures
(see Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach, 2007; and Assenmacher-Wesche and
Gerlach, 2008). We therefore do not explicitly incorporate a monetary growth
target rate for the period under study, but in econometric terms even if we
inserted a 4.5% growth rate throughout the period, (as long the target were
constant) this would drop out of the Taylor rule as a constant.
Against this background, we consider the following dynamic version of the
Taylor rule
it = ρit−1 +(1−ρ)
½
β0 + β1(E [πt+n | Ωt] − π∗
t)+
β2(E [yt | Ωt] − y∗




The policy feedback coeﬃcients reﬂect the central bank’s respective attention
to price stability, economic activity and monetary growth in making monetary
policy decisions. Various studies (eg, Arestis and Chortareas, 2006;
Carstensen, 2006; Fendel and Frenkel, 2006; Hayo and Hofmann, 2006; Huchet,
2000) have used the above Taylor-type reaction function with or without the
monetary variable to examine monetary policy for the euro area. Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (1998) also ﬁnds that this reacti o nf u n c t i o ns p e c i ﬁcation provides
a good representation of monetary policy for major central banks in periods
particularly after the early 1980s.
An earlier version of the Taylor (1993) rule employs only lagged values
of the independent variables, implying a backward-looking monetary policy
behavior. However, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998), Faust, Rogers, and
Wright (2001), and Fernandez and Nikolsko-Rzbevskyy (2007) ﬁnd that
the forward-looking model speciﬁcation, as captured by equation (2.2),
better reﬂects monetary policy conduct of major central banks than do its
backward-looking counterparts.
2.2 Estimation issues
There are two issues in estimating the policy reaction function captured by
equation (2.3). Both issues arise from the fact that data for the independent
variables are not directly observable at the time that monetary policy decisions
are made. First, the forward-looking speciﬁcation of the Taylor rule assumes
that policymakers react to their expectations about future inﬂation and the
output gap, not their past realized values. Second, data for the output gap
10requires information about the potential output level, which is also not directly
observable.
For inﬂation expectations, we consider central banks’ policy responses
to one-period ahead expectations of inﬂation (n =1 ). The central banks’
published forecasts serve as reasonable measures for the expected inﬂation
and output gap data, but such forecasts, however, are largely unavailable for
countries other than the U.S. and the U.K. Following most studies in the
recent literature, including Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) and Muscatelli,
Tirelli, and Trecroci (2002), we instead adopt the errors-in-variables approach
that involves the generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate ex
post realized data along with a set of instrumental variables. To reﬂect the
policymakers’ information set at the time of an interest rate decision, the
instruments include four lagged values of the policy interest rate, inﬂation
and output gap series. GMM estimations are carried out using an optimal
weighting matrix that accounts for potential heteroskasticity and serial
correlation in the error term.
Another estimation issue concerns the data for potential output. A popular
method to obtain estimates for potential output is to extract a nonlinear
trend from GDP data using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter or a band pass
ﬁlter. However, Laubach and Williams (2003) argue that these univariate
ﬁlters ignore information from movements in inﬂation and thus provide a
misleading picture of the recent trends in such variables as interest rates and
output. These ﬁlters are also inappropriate from a conceptual perspective.
As Muscatelli, Tirelli, and Trecroci (2002) point out, they are commonly
executed using the full sample of estimation data, meaning that policymakers
are assumed to possess information about future GDP data that they in fact
do not know in real time.
To better model policymakers’ decision making process, we obtain a
measure of the output gap using a structural approach. Following King, Stock,
and Watson (1995) and Lee (2000), among others, we extract the unobservable










φioilt−i + νt (2.4)
where the variable oil controls for the inﬂuence of supply shocks and is
measured by the ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the log world crude oil price level. In
equation (2.4), potential output captures the level of output consistent with
stable inﬂation, ignoring the transitory shocks to aggregate supply. The term
y∗
t is an unobservable component that is estimated by a recursive Kalman ﬁlter
in state-space form along with the assumption that follows a random walk (plus
drift).7
7The Kalman ﬁlter recursive updating procedure is executed in a state-space




t = δ + y
∗
t−1 + υt (2.5)
2.3 Data
We examine quarterly data beginning in 1994, when the forerunner of the ECB
— European Monetary Institute — was created. Except for M3, the data are
available through the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators8 database, and all
variables are collected on a quarterly basis. Today, the euro area consists of
15 member states, including the 11 original stage three members of the EMU,
Greece (joining in 2001) and Slovenia (joining in 2007), Cyprus and Malta
(both joining in 2008). Because our dataset ends in 2007, the euro area here
consists of the ﬁrst 12 member states, excluding Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta.
Inﬂation is measured by the year-over-year percentage change in the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). To gain some perspective on
the extent of heterogeneity across national economies in the euro area, we
plot the inﬂation data for individual member states in Figure 1 along with the
area-wide data. The dotted line shows the targeted inﬂation rates which varies
according to the Maastricht Treaty inﬂation criteria for membership of EMU
before 1999, but from 1999:1 and thereafter is ﬁxed at two per cent.
The output gap is measured by 100 times the log level of real GDP less
the log level of potential GDP. Following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998),
among others, the measure of monetary policy instrument is the equivalent of
the overnight interbank lending rate. For example, such a rate for Germany
before 1999 is its call rate. Interest rate data for the ECB between 1994
a n d1 9 9 8a r et a k e nf o ra l lb a n k si n c l u d e di nt h ec a l c u l a t i o no ft h eE u r i b o r .
Beginning in 1999, the interest rates for euro area member states are identical
to the policy rate of the ECB, as proxied by the 1-month Euribor rate.9
The money growth variable is measured by the year-over-year percentage
change in M3. Even though the ECB publishes M3 data for the euro area
as a whole, corresponding data for individual member states are not publicly
available. To deal with this problem, we use updated versions of the estimates
from Mehrotra (2007) for the national contributions to euro area M3. The
data are available only for 9 member states (excluding Greece, Ireland and
Luxembourg) so we include the monetary variable only when available.
8Euro area data refer to the evolving composition of the euro area. Data for periods
prior to 2001 refer to EU11 (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain). Data for periods between 2001 and
2005 refer to EU12 (EU11 plus Greece).
9Although the European Overnight Index Average (EONIA) is at ﬁrst pass the best
candidate, there are widely-reported problems with using this variable as a central bank
policy rate because of the 4-week reserve averaging in use at the ECB, which led to very
volatile rates towards the end of averaging periods.
123E s t i m a t i o n r e s u l t s
3.1 Full sample period results
Table 1 reports GMM estimation results for the euro area as well as its
member states over the period 1994:1—2007:4. Judging by the standard errors
of estimates (SEE) in the sixth column of Table 1, the Taylor rule ﬁts the
data of Austria and Germany better than other euro area member states
as well as the euro area as a whole. It is also noteworthy that all of the
reported J-statistics (seventh column) for testing overidentifying restrictions
indicate that the selected set of instruments in model estimations is relevant. In
other words, the statistics support the exogeneity property of the instrumental
variables with respect to monetary policy decisions.
For most member states, the estimated coeﬃcient for the lagged policy rate
(ρ) is fairly close to one, implying a great deal of ‘inertia’ in monetary policy.10
The intercept term (β0) in the ‘target’ rate equation represents the equilibrium
or long-run ‘target’ rate. The respective estimates vary remarkably across
member states and one is even negative (Portugal): though not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Similarly, the coeﬃcient estimates for the future inﬂation gap (inﬂation
rate minus targeted inﬂation rate) variable vary widely across member states.
The estimate for the euro area as a whole is about -0.4 and statistically
insigniﬁcant, which diﬀers remarkably from those of individual member states.
The estimates for Finland, Greece, Italy and Spain are relatively higher,
suggesting aggressive responses to expected inﬂation from these member
states. On the other hand, the estimates for other member states are mostly
statistically insigniﬁcant, but with negative estimated coeﬃcients for France,
Ireland and the Netherlands. Unlike the estimates for inﬂation, the output
gap coeﬃcient estimates are mostly positive, except for the case of Portugal.
For the 9 member states that we have M3 data for, the reaction function
includes M3 growth in addition to inﬂation and the output gap. For the
euro area, the coeﬃcient estimate for the money growth variable enters with a
signiﬁcant and negative sign for Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain,
reﬂecting the expected relationship between money growth and interest rates11
but with a signiﬁcant and postive sign for Portugal. The evidence of such a
relationship is, however, much weaker among most member states.
10Despite possible non-stationarity in the interest rate series, we follow the majority of
the existing literature by specifying the interest rate variables in levels in order to compare
our results with those in the literature. Alternatively, for interest rates identiﬁed with a
unit-root (Finland and Ireland), we have followed Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and estimated
the Taylor rule with an error-correction approach. The overall results are nevertheless the
same as those reported here.
11A negative estimate implies that the liquidity eﬀect dominates the expected inﬂation
eﬀect of an increase in money supply.
133.2 Structural change
Before proceeding further with the estimation results, it makes sense to ﬁrst
test for structural stability in the estimated model parameters. Particularly
for euro area member states, handing over monetary policy to the ECB could
lead to a change in policy feedback coeﬃcients and thus parameter instability
in the estimated policy reaction functions.
To explore possible parameter instability, we consider Chow-type tests
with ap r i o r iunknown break points. Speciﬁcally, we compute Andrews
and Ploberger (1994) MeanF and SupF, and Hansen’s (Hansen, 1997) LC
statistics for estimating equation 2.3 as described in the preceding section. The
Andrews-Ploberger tests are primarily for detecting a sudden break, while the
Hansen test is for a smooth change.
Test results for the estimated Taylor rule are reported in the last three
columns of Table 1. The null hypothesis for all tests is constancy in all
estimated parameters. Parameter instability is evident for most member states
the sample and the euro area, even though not all alternative statistics are
signiﬁcant. The LC statistics overall provide stronger evidence of structural
change than the MeanF or SupF statistics do. In other words, the bulk of
euro area member states witnessed a gradual rather than abrupt change in
monetary policy reaction over the estimation period.
3.3 Recursive estimation results
In light of the evidence of structural instability in the estimated policy reaction
function, we follow a procedure similar to Boivin (2006) and allow for evolution
in parameters by applying recursive estimations. For each country, we ﬁrst run
GMM estimation of equation 2.3 using data over the period 1994:1—1999:1.
Sequentially, we re-estimate the model by adding data one period at a time
until the estimation reaches the end of our observation period in 2007:4.
Because Greece did not become part of the Eurosystem until 2001, its Taylor
rule estimation ends at 2000:4 and the ﬁrst period for recursive coeﬃcient
updating is 2001:1.
Figures 2 to 4 illustrate recursive estimates of the coeﬃcients over time for
the lagged interest rate (ρ), intercept (β0), inﬂation (β1), the output gap (β2),
and money growth (β3) for each member state. The time periods shown in
the plots refer to the ﬁnal period of recursive estimation. The solid lines are
coeﬃcient estimates, encapsulated by the plus and minus two standard error
intervals (shaded bands). To facilitate comparisons, we also superimpose the
respective coeﬃcient estimates for the euro area (dotted lines).
The plots for the estimated coeﬃcients on the lagged interest rate reﬂect
very little adjustment in monetary policy behavior in the face of changing
economic conditions. For the euro area as a whole, the estimate is around 0.8
in the ﬁrst two years of ECB operation before reaching 0.85 in 2004. The overall
high degree of interest rate smoothing across member states, particularly
Germany, is widely observed in the literature of policy reaction functions, eg,























































































































































































 The intercept term represents the long-run ‘target’ interest rate. The
estimate for the euro area hovers around four percent, but the corresponding
estimates for Portugal are negative during much of the observation period and
the rate for Finland is close to zero for much of the period. The declining trend
in the long-run ‘target’ rate measures ac r o s sm a n ym e m b e rs t a t e si sa s s o c i a t e d
with declining inﬂation trends over the observation period.
For the inﬂation coeﬃcients, the recursive estimate in the case of the euro
area is rather stable at about 1 percent before 2004, after this it declines
over time. There is evidence of convergence over time between the euro area
coeﬃcient estimates and the corresponding estimates for some member states
(Belgium, France, Ireland and the Netherlands), but divergence for some
others (Finland, Greece, Italy and Spain). At the end of the observation
period, however, there is no statistically signiﬁcant discrepancy between the
two coeﬃcient estimates for Austria, Belgium, France and Ireland, but for
all the other member states there is a statistically signiﬁcant discrepancy,
indicating divergence in inﬂation rates.
T h ef o u r t hc o l u m no fp l o t ss h o w st h eo u t p u tg a pc o e ﬃcient estimates. In
contrast to the downward trend in the inﬂation coeﬃcient estimate, the output
gap coeﬃcient estimate for the euro area shows an upward trend, reaching
nearly 2.86 by 2007. The ECB’s output coeﬃcient estimates are higher than
the corresponding estimates for most member states, except Spain, although
it is interesting that the coeﬃcient for France converges on that of the ECB by
the end of 2007. Luxembourg and Portugal have coeﬃcients that are either not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero or signiﬁcantly negative for much of the period.
The comparative results highlight the extent of heterogeneity among individual
economies within the euro area. As emphasized by ECB oﬃcials (Duisenberg,
2001), the ECB responds only to the euro area-wide economic conditions. The
estimation results imply that policy might appear to be too tight for some euro
area member states while too loose for others. More speciﬁcally, the ECB’s
weights on inﬂation and the output gap are higher than the corresponding
weights for some member states while lower than some others.
A few studies of European monetary policy have focused on comparing
the behavior of the ECB with the Bundesbank. For example, Faust, Rogers,
and Wright (2001), and Hayo and Hofmann (2006) assert that the ECB in
its early years put a higher weight on the output gap relative to the weight
on inﬂation than the Bundesbank would have. However, our estimations that
allow model coeﬃcients to drift over time suggest the opposite for a much
longer observation period.
T h el a s tc o l u m no fp l o t si nF i g u r e s2t o4s h o wt h ec o e ﬃcient estimates for
money growth. For the euro area, the recursive estimates remain negative over
the entire observation period, even though they vary noticeably over time. For
individual member states, however, the coeﬃcients are positive in the case of
Portugal. In addition, the estimates are largely indiﬀerent from zero in the
cases of Belgium and Finland and negative in the cases of Austria, France,
Germany and Spain, with the most dramatic change noted for Italy and Spain
where the sign of the coeﬃcient starts signiﬁcantly positive and ends up as
signiﬁcantly negative. These ﬁndings suggest that the ECB policy rate reﬂects
the monetary conditions of the entire euro area, but not necessarily all its
16individual member states, but they also imply that in some member states
the liquidity eﬀect dominates and in others a (Fisher) expected inﬂation eﬀect
dominates.
The disparities between the coeﬃcient estimates for the euro area and
individual member states highlight the diﬃculty of managing diﬀerent
economies with a single monetary policy. However, it remains diﬃcult from the
individual plots in Figures 2 to 4 to judge whether the monetary policy might
be too tight or too loose at a given period of time. For instance, as argued by
Judd and Rudebusch (1998), an increase in the coeﬃcient on the output gap
may reﬂect central bank oﬃcials’ increased emphasis on using developments
in the output gap to forecast future inﬂation. Similarly, monetary growth is
widely conceived (eg Gerlach and Svensson, 2000) as an indicator of future
inﬂationary pressures.
4 Counterfactual analysis
4.1 Counterfactual analysis for policy rates
Given the estimation results for the Taylor-type reaction function, we ask the
following questions:
1. What would the policy rates have been if the ECB made decisions based
on the economic data of individual member states instead of the euro
area as a whole?; and
2. What would interest rates for a euro area member state have been if its
central bank were to make its own policy decisions instead of adopting
the ECB policy?
To address the ﬁrst question, we perform a set of counterfactual exercises as
follows. For each country, we calculate the path of its interest rate using the
estimated coeﬃcients for the ECB but using its own historical values for the
explanatory variables. More speciﬁcally, we generate ‘counterfactual’ interest
rates for each member state as
e it = b ρ


















where an ‘a’ superscript denotes the corresponding estimate for the euro area
and a coeﬃcient with a hat represents a (time-varying) recursive coeﬃcient
estimate obtained from the preceding section. Only coeﬃcient estimates that
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or higher in full-sample estimation
(Table 1) are included in generating the ‘counterfactual’ interest rate paths.
In addition, the last term is ignored for member states (Greece, Ireland
and Luxembourg) without M3 data. Equation (4.1) essentially generates
the hypothetical interest rate series for the ECB by assuming that it made
monetary policy decisions for each member state individually based on its
national data.
17Alternatively, the second question deals with a hypothetical situation in
which central banks in the euro area were to set interest rates individually.
We assume that the central banks followed a policy rule established prior
to 1999:1, as captured by the same Taylor rule in equation (2.3) estimated
over the period 1994:1-1998:4. In other words, we generate another set of
‘counterfactual’ policy interest rates by replacing the coeﬃcients in equation
(4.1) with the estimates for the pre-1999 subperiod. Because Greece did not
become part of the euro area until 2001, the Taylor rule estimation ends at
2000:4 and the ﬁrst period of simulation is 2001:1.
Figure 5 shows the results of the counterfactual exercises. The solid lines
are in-sample forecasts of the policy rate using the inﬂation targeters’ own
recursive coeﬃcient estimates. The shaded bands are the 95% conﬁdence
intervals around the in-sample ﬁtted values, and these are used as ‘baseline’
values to assess the appropriateness of ECB monetary policy. For each country,
a dotted line is a ‘counterfactual’ series obtained from ﬁtting equation (4.1)
with the recursive coeﬃcient estimates for the ECB reaction function but the
values of the explanatory variables for that member state. A dashed line is
a ‘counterfactual’ series obtained from ﬁtting equation (4.1) with the ﬁxed
coeﬃcient estimates for individual member states over the pre-1999 subperiod
instead of using the ECB coeﬃcients.
The majority of ‘counterfactual’ series implied by the estimated ECB
reaction function (dotted lines) mirror the general trend of the ﬁtted interest
rates (in-sample ﬁtted values) but they are more volatile. This implies that
ECB monetary policy has been more rigid over time than the hypothetical
interest rates that responded to the economic conditions of individual euro area
member states. In the case of Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands and Portugal the two series are overall not qualitatively
diﬀerent from each other over the simulation period, as judged by the 95%
conﬁdence bands. The two series are the closest for Germany.
In comparison with the ﬁrst set of ‘counterfactual’ series, there appears
more disparity among the second set of ‘counterfactual’ series (dashed lines)
that are constructed using the estimated Taylor rules of individual member
states over the pre-euro subperiod. Except for Austria, Belgium, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, the ‘counterfactual’ series tend to follow the
same trends as the ﬁtted series. There is no meaningful discrepancy between
t h e‘ c o u n t e r f a c t u a l ’i n t e r e s tr a t ea n dt h eﬁtted rate over time in the cases of
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland and Luxembourg. Similar to the ﬁrst set
of counterfactual exercises, these counterfactual exercises suggest that if the
majority of national central banks in the euro area were to follow their own
policy rules established prior to joining the monetary union, then their interest
rates would have been meaningfully diﬀerent from those set by the ECB. In
particular, the results show that the economic conditions in the Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain would have dictated higher interest rates than those set
by the ECB.
184.2 Counterfactual analysis for ‘target’ rates
The results in the above counterfactual analyses are largely aﬀected by
the substantial amounts of interest rate smoothing in monetary policy
conduct. As with Faust, Rogers, and Wright (2001), we alternatively perform
counterfactual exercises on the ‘target’ interest rates instead of the actual
policy rates. To gain some perspective on the importance of focusing on the
‘target’ interest rates, Figure 6 plots the actual interest rates (solid lines) and
the ﬁtted ‘target’ values (dotted lines). For each country, the ﬁtted ‘target’
rates are the ﬁtted values using the recursive coeﬃcient estimates in equation
(2.1). These values are essentially predictions of the ECB monetary policy
rate as a function of the inﬂation and the output gap variables. In most cases,
the ﬁtted ‘target’ series is less smooth than the actual interest series and any
deviation between the two appears temporary over time. The exceptions are
the cases for Finland and Ireland. For Finland, the ﬁtted ‘target’ rate is
persistently lower than the actual ECB rate, reﬂecting the lower inﬂation that
was sustained over much of the post-1999 period. The opposite is true of
Ireland.
In light of the observed diﬀerences between the actual interest rates and the
ﬁtted ‘target’ values, we replicate the counterfactual exercises in the previous
subsection for the ‘target’ rate instead of the actual policy rate. To do so,
we generate a counterfactual ‘target’ rate (e i∗
t) path for each country using a
procedure analogous to that captured by equation (4.1)
e i
∗
t = b β
a











Analogous to the results for actual policy rates in Figure 6, Figure 7 shows the
counterfactual results for the ‘target’ rates. Again, the solid lines are in-sample
forecasts using the member states’ own estimated coeﬃcients, the dotted lines
(exercise 1) are ‘counterfactual’ series using the ECB’s reaction function, and
the dashed lines (exercise 2) are ‘counterfactual’ series using the individual
member states’ pre-euro reaction function.
The overall ﬁndings stand in contrast to those observed in Figure 6. For
the counterfactual exercises under the hypothetical scenario that the ECB
responded to the economic data of individual member states, there is some
discrepancy between the ﬁtted interest rates and the ‘counterfactual’ path
(dotted line) for every country. The ‘counterfactual’ path follows most closely
the ﬁtted ‘target’ rates in the cases of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and
the Netherlands. Overall, the two interest rate paths tend to be much closer in
the second half of the observation period than the earlier years of ECB history.
This reﬂects convergence of the euro member states.
Under the alternative hypothetical scenario that central banks were able
to pursue individual monetary policy, the counterfactual ‘target’ rate path
(dashed line) follows the ﬁtted ‘target’ rates most closely in the cases of
France and Germany. In those cases, the discrepancy between the two
series is virtually nonexistent, implying that the ECB policy conduct is a
natural extension of the policy of the Bundesbank and the Banque de France.
Other than Germany and France, the counterfactual series and ﬁtted ‘target’
rate series are quite close in the cases of Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
19On the contrary, the counterfactual ‘target’ rate paths for other member
states are persistently higher than their ﬁtted ‘target’ rates over much of
simulation period. This is attributable to the fact that those member states
had experienced relatively high inﬂation prior to joining the monetary union.
Overall, the counterfactual results for the ‘target’ rates clearly reveal that
the ECB monetary policy best reﬂects the economic conditions of the larger
members, and most notably Germany and France. The divergence between
the ﬁtted ECB ‘target’ rate and the rate implied by a country’s economic
conditions is more pronounced for smaller euro area members. The results are
supported by Huchet (2000), who ﬁn d sa s y m m e t r i cE C Bp o l i c ye ﬀects among
euro area members. Moreover, the ﬁndings in this subsection, which stand in
contrast to the results for the observed policy rates in the preceding subsection,
highlight the role of the interest rate smoothing behavior in monetary policy
conduct.
4.3 Policy stress
The results of the counterfactual exercises in Figure 7 could be considered to
reveal the extent of policy ‘stress’ for a monetary union like the euro area, as
emphasized by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) and as implemented by Sturm
and Wollmershäuser (2008) and Flaig and Wollmershäuser (207). Figure 8
plots the gaps between the ﬁtted ‘target’ rate series and the counterfactual
series constructed using equation (4.2). In particular, the point estimates in
Figure 8 equal the ﬁtted ‘target’ rates for each country (solid lines in Figure
7) minus the counterfactual ‘target’ rates using the ECB feedback coeﬃcients
(dotted lines in Figure 7). A positive value implies that the ECB target rate
was higher than what would be expected by a euro area country using its
country-speciﬁc data, while a negative value, on the contrary, implies that
the ECB policy was more accommodative than expected. The shaded areas
represent the 95% conﬁdence bands using the bootstrap method with 1,000
replications.
Even though the results in Figure 8 vary markedly across member states
as well as over time, it is apparent that the extent of monetary policy stress
is overall not qualitatively signiﬁcant for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany
and the Netherlands. The results for these ﬁve member states are consistent
with the argument of Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008) that small euro area
members have received more than proportional weights in ECB monetary
policy decisions. On the other hand, the ECB ‘target’ rates beginning 2003
were more accommodative for such member states as Portugal and Greece,
than the target rates warranted by the economic conditions of these individual
member states.
Figure 9 illustrates the extent of policy stress of diﬀerent member states,
as measured alternatively by taking the diﬀerence between the ﬁtted ‘target’
rates (solid lines in Figure 7) minus the counterfactual ‘target’ rates using the
pre-euro coeﬃcients of those member states (dashed lines in Figure 7). For
three member states (France, Germany and Luxembourg), the point estimates
are not qualitatively diﬀerent from zero, meaning that the ECB ‘target’ rates
20were no diﬀerent from the target rates implied by their policy rules adopted
in the pre-euro period. By contrast, the estimates are overall negative for ﬁve
member states (Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), meaning that the
ECB ‘target’ rates tended to be more accommodative than if these member
states were to set their own ‘target’ rates according to their individual policy
rules established before joining the euro area. Taken together, Figures 8 and 9
suggest that the ECB ‘target’ rates might have been consistent with the rates
preferred by some member states, but they have appeared too loose for some
other members.
To gain some perspective about the ‘stress’ of using a single ECB monetary
policy on the national economies of the euro area, Figure 10 plots the weighted
averages of the respective policy stress indicators of individual members where
the member states’ annual GDP data are used to calculated the weights. The
absolute value of a member state’s policy stress data is used so that an ECB
monetary policy decision that is tighter than optimal for an individual member
state is treated equally to an ECB target rate that is too loose. The upper
panel of Figure 10 corresponds to the counterfactual exercise 1 with the ECB
coeﬃcients. The plot reveals that the overall monetary policy stress in the
euro area declined gradually in the ﬁrst two years of the ECB operation and
hovered around 2% over the rest of the observation period. The pattern in the
early years of the ECB can be interpreted as evidence of convergence among
EMU members. From around the middle of 2005 the stress indicator decreased
to around 1.5%, but in more recent years (since roughly the 2nd quarter of
2007), however, the monetary policy stress has clearly shown an increase.
The lower panel of Figure 10 corresponds to the counterfactual exercise
2 with the pre-euro coeﬃcients. In contrast to the pattern in the upper
panel, this ECB policy stress indicator appears more stable and its size is
around the same level at around 1.5%. The noticeable exception is the
nearly zero policy stress in 2001 when most euro area members experienced
an economic slowdown and then in 2006 when many member states also
experienced signiﬁcantly slower growth than before. Since the third quarter
of 2006, however, there has been a sharp upturn in monetary policy stress,
and as of the 3rd quarter of 2007, the indicator was higher than at any time
since the inception of the euro area. Taken together, the plots in Figure 10
indicate that the ECB policy rates were on average 1% to 2% diﬀerent from
what would be optimal for its participating member countries.
4.4 Robustness check
How robust are our empirical ﬁndings? To answer this question, we
have replicated the estimation and counterfactual exercises with several
modiﬁcations. First, instead of the Kalman ﬁl t e r ,w eh a v ee m p l o y e dt h e
standard HP ﬁlter and band pass ﬁlter to extract the trend component in
the GDP series. In either case, the output gap is measured as the deviation
of actual output from a nonlinear low-frequency trend component. Second,
instead of recursive estimations, we have performed estimations using a rolling
window of ﬁve years. Third, we have alternatively estimated the Taylor
21rule equation using contemporaneous and two-period-ahead data instead of
one-period-ahead data for inﬂation. Overall, these alternative speciﬁcations
have no appreciable qualitative eﬀect on the results presented above.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
ECB oﬃcials claim that monetary policy decisions take into consideration
the aggregate economic conditions of the euro area and disregard divergent
national developments. Against this background, this paper has investigated
the extent to which the ECB has respondedt oc h a n g i n ge c o n o m i cc o n d i t i o n s
of individual euro area member states versus the euro area as a whole. To this
end, we ﬁrst estimated a Taylor-type policy reaction function for euro area
member states as well as for the euro area as a whole. The estimation results
exhibit substantial disparities across member states, reﬂecting the extent of
heterogeneity among the national economies inside the euro area.
We also conducted counterfactual exercises based on the estimated reaction
functions to explore two alternative hypothetical scenarios. Under the
hypothetical condition that the ECB responded to the economic conditions
of individual euro area members, the ‘target’ interest rates for most member
states except France and Germany would have been quite diﬀerent from those
predicted by the area-wide data. This implies that the ECB policy rule best
ﬁts the economic conditions of certain member states.
Similar results for Germany and other contiguous member states (such as
Austria and Belgium) hold in the counterfactual exercises under an alternative
hypothetical scenario that individual euro area member states were able to set
their own policy rates. On the other hand, had other euro area member states
followed their own policy rule, then their interest rates would have been quite
diﬀerent from those predicted by the ECB policy rule.
The extent of heterogeneity across national economies within the euro area
entails a challenge for delegating the responsibility of monetary policy to the
ECB. Our empirical ﬁndings prompt concerns about the eﬃcacy of a single
monetary policy in reacting to changing economic conditions of individual
euro area member states. Because economies of euro area member states have
been somewhat unsynchronized, ECB policy actions, which might be adequate
for the euro area as a whole, might have been too loose for such faster growing
member states as Greece and Ireland but too tight for slower growing member
states, such as Italy.
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